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ABSTRACT 
 
Wesley E. Fine M.A. International Studies 
Department of Global and International Studies, May 2010 
University of Kansas 
 
This thesis explores how winning the hearts and minds in counterinsurgency is defined and 
uses David Galula‟s theory to determine whether the British counterinsurgency approaches 
in Malaya from 1948-1960 and in Oman from 1965-1975 supports his argument.  These 
cases demonstrate how complex and time consuming a counterinsurgency campaign 
requires.  In both cases innovative ideas and approaches that are regarded as unconventional 
were key elements to the overall British success in Malaya and in Oman.  The most daring 
and unorthodox approach used by the British in Malaya was the mass relocation of over  
500,000 locals to secured areas as an attempt to isolate the insurgent groups from their base 
support (local populace).  Despite the success of the mass relocation it was only one part of 
a number of moving approaches that were being used to achieve counterinsurgency success.  
In Oman, the British succeeded in producing an element that was made up of former 
insurgents and were able to expand its numbers by enticing them with monetary and 
occupational alternatives.  The British approach in Malaya and Oman required a variety of 
approaches in order for it to succeed.  This study suggests that there is not a single method 
that can be used for counterinsurgency success and that their approaches will continue to 
vary according to the different scenarios that a counterinsurgent is confronted with.  
However, all counterinsurgency approaches revolve around the principle of having some 
form of hearts and minds integrated into the overall plan.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
“What I‟m really telling people is the greatest risk we can accept is to lose 
the support of the people here. If the people are against us, we cannot be 
successful. If the people view us as occupiers and the enemy, we can‟t be 
successful and our casualties will go up dramatically.”
1
  General Stanley 
McChrystal, International Security Assistance Force and United States Forces – 
Afghanistan Commander. 
  
Employing counterinsurgency (COIN) will always involve the support of the local 
population because they determine who wins in a battle between a governing state and an 
insurgency.  An insurgency is the method of choice when a lack of resources and money makes it 
impossible to fight a state power out in the open.  As a result, an insurgency must rely on the 
general population for support making them the focus in a battle between a state power and the 
insurgents.  Previous employing powers of COIN have used the phrase, „winning the hearts and 
minds (WHAM),‟ as an approach to COIN serving as a guideline in creating division between 
the general population and the insurgents.  This is a critical process in COIN, making a WHAM 
approach necessary for its success.  For this reason, the British use of WHAM applied in Malaya 
and Oman will be used to determine how significant an impact it had on COIN success.    
The phrase WHAM is a broad concept and can be interpreted in a variety of different 
ways.  For the purpose of this research paper, the WHAM phrase will be defined using David 
Galula‟s theory of what success in COIN means.  He is a former French military officer and is 
considered to be an important theorist by defense experts on COIN.  Galula‟s credibility to COIN 
theory is attributed to his experience as a French officer serving in areas where the development 
of insurgent practices was taking place.  One of his more critical assignments contributing to his 
COIN theory was his service as a military attaché in 1945 at the French embassy located in 
                                                          
1
 General McChrystal interviewed by David Martin, 60 Minutes, CBS, September 27, 2009.   
7 
 
Beijing, China.  He observed one of history‟s greatest insurgent movements led by Mao Tse-tung 
and as a result he became familiar with insurgent practices.
2
  He argues:     
A victory is not (just) the destruction in a given area of the insurgent‟s forces and 
his political organization.  It is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent 
from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by 
and with the population.
3
  
 
There is an element of WHAM to Galula‟s argument because part of his theory in COIN 
success requires that the general population sustain isolation from insurgents and security from 
their attacks without the help or influence of counterinsurgents.  Building a trusted network 
among the populace so that they continue COIN efforts requires the need for their hearts and 
minds to be engaged on COIN efforts.  This is important because if the general population is not 
convinced of what employing power of COIN has to offer in comparison to the insurgents, the 
general population will succumb to the insurgency.       
Establishing rapport is an important factor in achieving a WHAM approach therefore, 
Greg Mortenson, a humanitarian who builds schools in Pakistan, is used as an example in 
capturing the hearts and minds of a local populace.  Because his work with the local populaces 
has been a success he has drawn attention from higher ranking U.S. military officers such as 
General David Petreus who currently serves as the International Security Assistance and 
Commander to the U.S. Forces Afghanistan.
4
  The Army War College has now made it 
mandatory for all its officers to read Greg Mortenson‟s Three Cups of Tea, a book that describes 
Mortensons‟ work in Pakistans‟ impoverished societies.
5
  His work in building schools in 
Pakistan has earned him high levels of respect among the locals in Pakistan.  Former Pakistani 
                                                          
2
 David Galula.  Counter-insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.  Praeger Security international: 1964, Foreward, 
4,5. 
3
 LTC Malevich, John.  U.S. Army and Marine COIN Center brief.  July 1, 2010. 
4
 Greg Mortenson and David Relin, Three Cups of Tea, (New York: Penguin Books, 2006) 53. 
5
 John Weis, “Making friends not Enemies,” Colorado Springs Independent, June 2008. 
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President Musharraf clearly indicated that his schools have resulted in success.
6
  Mortenson‟s 
work is a valid case in exploring COIN approaches. 
For the purpose of this research paper, the phrase „winning the hearts and minds,‟ will not 
necessarily mean being nice but that it requires an emotive („hearts‟) and cognitive („minds‟) 
component to the overall COIN strategy.
7
  The fluctuations of its use will depend on the 
variation of the culture COIN is applied towards.  Utilizing WHAM in one area may mean the 
use of monetary negotiations in exchange for certain services leading up towards Galula‟s theory 
of COIN success.  Other targeted areas may require some form of stability to achieve a WHAM 
approach.  Providing stability would allow some areas to develop and create their own economic 
gains without the disruption of insurgent activities.  A more common approach is the expansion 
of social services which focus on the construction of schools, hospitals, and jobs.  This approach 
is centered on WHAM of local populaces in COIN in order to ensure their full cooperation. 
What is COIN? 
In order to better understand COIN, one must understand the meaning of insurgency. 
According to Joint Publication 3-22, Counterinsurgency Operations, insurgency is defined as, 
“the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow 
or force change of a governing authority.  Insurgency can also refer to the groups itself.”  The 
same joint publication defines COIN as, “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”
8
  Another term 
often used to contrast COIN is counterterrorism (CT).  CT is defined as, “operations that include 
the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.”
9
   
                                                          
6
 Npr.com 
7
 LTC Malevich brief, July 1, 2010. 
8
 Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations.  5October 2009, I-1. 
9
 Ibid, I-2. 
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The term COIN and CT are two different methods and approaches in combating an 
insurgency.  CT operations focus on the destruction of enemy forces and is known to have more 
of a conventional mindset.  The conventional mindset in a combat zone is focused on seizing key 
terrain.  The map below depicts how a conventional map would look like and demonstrates the 
focus of seizing key terrain. 
 
 
US Army and Marine Coin Center brief (July 1, 2010). 
 
In contrast to CT, COIN focuses on cognitive terrain.  Cognitive terrain is understanding 
and producing a strategy that has been culturally modified so that a targeted populace is 
receptive to what an employing power of COIN may try to accomplish.  In a cognitive map, 
employing powers of COIN will focus on the root causes of an insurgency and focus on the local 
10 
 
populace rather than the terrain.
10
  The map below is an illustration of a more cognitive approach 
emphasizing the understanding of social structures within the local populace and is more in line 
with what COIN employers may use as a guideline in producing a WHAM in COIN approach.   
 
US Army and Marine Coin Center brief (July 1, 2010) 
 
RAITIONALE FOR USING COIN 
 COIN is a preferred method of countering an insurgency because the foundation of an 
insurgent group rests among the local populace.  In order to deny an insurgent group its base 
support there are two practical approaches that can be used.  The first is to destroy an insurgents‟ 
base support by eliminating the local populaces that are associated with it.  The CT approach 
best describes this technique.  This approach is difficult to apply because distinguishing what 
local populaces provide support to an insurgent group is like finding a needle in a haystack.  And 
even if there were any successes in identifying support for an insurgent group it would still be 
difficult to portray them as enemy combatants because they could always claim to be innocent 
bystanders and having them detained could create hostility against a state power trying to contain 
                                                          
10
 US Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Center. Coin brief by LTC John Malevich to the Human Terrain Team. 
1July 2010. 
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an insurgency.  A more preferred method would be the use of COIN application because it 
involves working with the local populaces rather than against them.  For this reason COIN 
strategies center on the WHAM approach as a basis to COIN operations.  The WHAM approach 
allows for an employing power of COIN to make a better impact in creating division among an 
insurgent group and their base support (local populaces).   
How winning the hearts and minds in counterinsurgency is defined by others 
 
There are a number of meanings to the phrase „Winning the Hearts and Minds.‟  The U.S. 
Army recently published a Field Manual (FM) 3-24 on COIN and described the phrase into two 
elements.   
A-26. … „Hearts‟ means persuading people that their best interests are served by 
COIN success.  „Minds‟ means convincing them that the force can protect them 
and that resisting it is pointless.  Note that neither concerns whether people like 
Soldiers and Marines.  Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.  Over 
time, successful trusted networks grow like roots into the populace.  They 
displace enemy networks, which forces enemies into the open, letting military 
forces seize the initiative and destroy insurgents.
11
 
 
The U.S. Army‟s definition of „hearts and minds,‟ closely resembles Hew 
Strachan‟s  definition, which he argues is a symbol of authority.  Strachan is currently a 
professor at Oxford University and is a military historian and author to a number of 
published works relating to the administration of the British Army and the history of the 
First World War.
12
  His emphasis is not about establishing rapport with a targeted local 
populace, it is about providing a firm and stable government.  However, Strachan agrees 
that providing certain social services can help strengthen the credibility of government.   
Thomas Mockaitis is currently a professor of history at DePaul University and his recent 
work has covered writings in COIN, terrorism, insurgencies, and peace operations.  He also 
                                                          
11
 U.S. Department of the Army. “Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24.”  December 2006, Appendix A-5. 
12
 http://www.history.ox.ac.uk/staff/postholder/strachan_hfa.htm. 
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participates at the Center for Civil-Military Relations of the Naval Postgraduate School as an 
adjunct faculty professor.
13
  In contrast to Strachan‟s definition, Mockaitis‟s definition of the 
phrase is based on evaluating the local populace and identifying factors that cause hostility.  
Based on those factors, appropriate measures such as increasing employment, running electricity, 
water, healthcare, and construction of schools can be used as counter measures in minimizing 
civilian hostility.  He argues that providing basic needs is a key approach in the hearts and minds 
campaign.
14
   
Army British officer, Colonel I.A. Rigden defines the hearts and minds approach as more 
coercive.  Rigden believes that the key is changing the perception of a targeted local populace 
and that sometimes aggressive measures are needed to achieve their agenda such as establishing 
curfews, riot control, or even displacing and relocating the civilian populace.  Once this is 
achieved, Rigden believes that social programs such as medical, schools and other social support 
would win over their hearts.
15
   
Ridgen‟s argument is more aggressive in comparison to Mockaiti‟s and Strachan‟s 
definition, but what all three have in common is changing the popular perception through social 
incentives.  This involves building the economic and political policies of a targeted populace in 
order to win over popular support.  Despite the differences in approach, they all have the same 
intent.  Strachman‟s argument is about establishing a firm government.  In order to have a 
successful COIN policy, a stable government is required.  This leads to the stability and security 
of the general populace and what Ridgen‟s theory of WHAM means.  Differing methods in 
achieving security will vary depending on the cultural norm of a targeted populace.  When a 
                                                          
13
 http://condor.depaul.edu/~tmockait/ 
14
 Paul Dixon. “Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq.”  Journal of Strategic Studies. 
32 (2009): 364. 
 
15
 Ibid, 364. 
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stable government and effective security is established, this often minimizes the hostility and 
increases the confidence a local populace would have with its government and the employers of 
COIN.  This allows for Mockaitis‟s argument that the basic needs of the general populace be met 
in order to achieve a WHAM approach.  However, achieving a firm government, providing 
effective security, and expanding social services for the local populace may not be enough 
because there is always a risk that an insurgency may re-integrate with the local populace once 
an employer of COIN withdraws.  The different WHAM approaches are all great ideas in theory 
but will not achieve COIN success unless the general population believes and conceives what 
COIN employers are trying to achieve.  The end result will require Galula‟s theory that the 
general population must maintain COIN employment without being forced upon by its 
government or the employers of COIN.            
THE BRITISH IN MALAYA AND OMAN   
 According to Bard E. O‟Neil, professor of international affairs at the National War 
College and director of the insurgency and revolution argues that, 
insurgent terrorism is purposeful, rather than mindless, violence because terrorists 
seek to achieve specific long-term, intermediate, and short-term goals.  The long-
term goal is to change the political community, political system, authorities, or 
policies. The intermediate goal of terrorism is not so much the desire to deplete 
the government fiscal resources as it is to erode its psychological support by 
instilling fear into officials and their domestic and international supporters.
16 
 The insurgent purpose described by O‟Neils argument is best used to describe the 
insurgent purpose that the British were confronted with in both Malaya and Oman.  The 
commonalities in both cases suggest that the insurgencies not only provide a purposeful 
intent but do provide an appealing purpose to the general populace whether it is through 
diplomatic or coercive measures.  This demonstrates their ability to structurally organize 
                                                          
16
 Bard E. O‟Neil.  Armed Struggle in Palestine:  A Political-Military Analysis.  Boulder: Westview Press, 1978. 
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coordinated propaganda and violence towards a governing power and their associates in 
order to achieve their goals. 
The most favorable advantage an insurgent group has is their ability to freely 
move in disguise amongst the local populace making it very difficult for a state power to 
identify friendly from foe.  China‟s leading architect in guerilla warfare, MaoTse-Tung , 
is quoted in 1949 saying that, “The Guerilla must move amongst the people, as a fish 
swims in the sea.  Dry up the sea, or drain the swamp, through a hearts and minds 
campaign and the fish die.”
17
  Mao Tse-Tung‟s theory on the guerilla demonstrates how 
much of an advantage an insurgent group has over the counterinsurgent.  This also shows 
the complexities and difficulties the counterinsurgent must overcome if the 
counterinsurgent is to succeed.   
A COIN operation based on the British approach in Malaya and Oman was a long 
drawn out process.  This kind of operation is best described by John Nagle as, “Learning 
to eat soup with a knife.”  This is a subtitle to a book he authored in Counterinsurgency 
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.  In the British attempt to achieve COIN success their 
strategies and approaches were continually modified.  This suggests that innovative 
approaches are almost a requirement in order to achieve COIN success.  In a battle 
between insurgent forces and counterinsurgents, both sides will seek to establish and 
increase their own legitimacy (state power and employing power of COIN) while the 
insurgent group will try to delegitimize their governance.  As a result, the insurgent group 
will use anything it can to destabilize a government in order to introduce its political 
ideology and gain power.  
                                                          
17
 Paul Dixon.  “Hearts and Minds?: British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq.”  Journal of Strategic Studies.  
32: 3, 362. 
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 The historical background leading up towards the development and employment of COIN 
is important to understand because it provides a state power conducting COIN the necessary 
contextual information in producing and understanding an effective COIN approach.  The British 
in Malaya prior to the insurgencies were already working with the Malayan populace to 
successfully block off a Japanese invasion during WWII.  When Britain allied with the Malayan 
forces during the Japanese invasion it proved to the Malayan populace that the British were 
capable of working in conjunction with its government to successfully defeat a foreign threat.  
This contributed to the British-Malayan working relations in employing COIN.  As a result, this 
helped establish political relations between the British and Malayan government forces in order 
to produce a system of governance that would minimize support for the Malayan insurgency.  
What made it easier for the British in Oman in comparison to Malaya was that Oman had been 
deprived of social services and the insurgency was based on the Omani governments‟ lack of 
providing needed services.  As a result, the British focus in gaining popular support had been to 
emphasize the need of providing those services.  In order to meet this requirement, the British 
established a five point plan in Oman to gain support:  
1.  Increase in civil development programs (focusing in particular on Dhofari 
agriculture). 
2. Increased medical and veterinary services for the local populace. 
3. The creation of an intelligence cell. 
4. A psychological operations program and the expansion of government forces to evict 
the adoo (enemy) from the jebel (mountain in Akhdar). 
5. Enlisting Dhofaris to fight for the Sultan.18  
 The Malayan operation focused on a variety of approaches to gain local support.  Robert 
Thompson, a key British administrator served in the Malayan Emergency as Deputy Secretary 
followed by 1957 to 1961 as Secretary of Defense.  In the 1960s, he served as head of the British 
                                                          
18
 Geraint Hughes, A Model Campaign Reappraised: The Counter-insurgency War in Dhofar, Oman, 1965-1975.  
Journal of Strategic Studies, v.32:2, 2009, 282. 
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Advisory Mission to the U.S. in Vietnam.
19
  He published a number of books regarding case 
studies on the Vietnam conflict.  One was Defeating communist insurgency; the lessons of 
Malaya and Vietnam.  Thompson‟s experience in Malaya added to the theoretical approaches in 
COIN.  They were implemented during the Malayan Emergency, and they later served as a basis 
for COIN approaches in Oman. Thompson‟s five principles in COIN are: 
1. Governments should have a clear political aim. 
2. Function within the law. 
3. Establish a coordinated overall plan encompassing both political and military 
objectives. 
4. Place emphasis on countering political subversion. 
5. Secure the base area prior to conducting a military campaign.20  
Thompson‟s five principles are a proven method for COIN because of their successful 
application in Malaya, but his principles evolved throughout the Malayan Emergency and were 
modified in the end.  This demonstrates how versatile a COIN plan must be.  Thompson‟s 
modified principles in COIN were now at six. They included the following: 
1. The recognition that political action designed to prevent the insurgents gaining 
popular support should take priority over purely military action. 
2. The requirement for complete civil-military cooperation 
3. The need for coordination of intelligence. 
4. The separation of the insurgents from the population through the wining of the 
hearts and minds. 
5. The appropriate use of military force to support pacification  
6. Lasting political reform to prevent the recurrence of insurgency.21   
Thompson‟s theoretical approach elaborates the importance of establishing a political 
focus over military approaches in COIN.  However, he elaborates that a military 
approach cannot be ignored and that both are needed to conduct COIN.  In both Malaya 
                                                          
19
Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, Singapore: Oxford 
University Press 1989, 3. 
20
 John Nagle. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.  Wesport:  
Praeger Publishers, 2002, 29. 
21
 J.E. Peterson, Oman‟s Insurgencies: The Sultanate‟s Struggle for Supremacy.  Saqi LTD: Lebanon, 2007, 30  
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and Oman the British produced strategies that focused on gaining popular support from 
the local populace.  This was important because insurgency support came from the local 
populace and led to the battle between government forces and an insurgency for the 
hearts and minds of the local populace. 
 The employment of COIN is a far more difficult operation to conduct in 
comparison to insurgent operations.  The insurgent group chooses when and where they 
will attack a state power, while the employing power of COIN must be ready at any given 
moment.  In order to ensure stability, security patrols and defensive postures must be 
employed at all times requiring the manpower for COIN employment to be far greater 
than that of the insurgent.   
GALULA’S THEORY 
 Galula‟s theory in COIN success is based on winning the popular support of the 
people.  He argues that a counterinsurgent will be faced with persuading a local 
population that is split into three groups.  The first group will involve an active minority 
that supports the counterinsurgents.  The second group will be a neutral majority and the 
third will be a minority group that supports the insurgents.
22
 
 The diagram below is a basic illustration of Galula‟s theory in what both the 
counterinsurgent and the insurgent would face in a battle for the support of the local 
populace.  In any insurgency Galula argues that there is always a majority of the 
population that is neutral.  The neutral majority becomes the battleground for both the 
counterinsurgent and insurgent to determine who will win in the end.  Despite the 
majority of the population being neutral there are two groups that Galula classifies as an 
                                                          
22
 David Galula foreward by Bruce Hoffman.  Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958.  South Hayes: Rand Corporation, 
2006, 114.  
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active minority for the counterinsurgent and the insurgent.  The active minority plays an 
important role to the counterinsurgent because they become their link to the general 
populace and play an important role in COIN efforts.  Contrary to the insurgent group, 
their organization is built up among the local populace giving them the advantage.      
19 
 
 
 Although COIN approaches in Malaya and Oman differ, part of the development 
of a COIN approach is drawn from the geographical location and culture of a targeted 
20 
 
area.  The template in achieving COIN success may be the same but figuring out how to 
gain and sustain popular support is the question.   As a result, there is no specific COIN 
approach that could be used for all insurgencies because different cultures will require 
different approaches.   
Galula‟s theory is used to define COIN success however, what the graph above 
does not suggest is the process and complexity it requires to gain local support.  
Furthermore applying COIN in Malaya and Oman suggests that there is a great deal of 
innovation involved because a COIN strategy would require the knowledge of political 
and cultural norms in order to identify methods in achieving a WHAM in COIN approach.  
Comparisons can be made between two legitimate political parties campaigning for 
political power.  The difference in a state power and an insurgent group looking to 
dominate government is that the insurgent group will integrate destructive methods to try 
and coerce its way into power.  However, the ultimate victor will be determined by the 
local populace and dependent upon their support either for the state power 
(counterinsurgents) or the insurgent group.
23
      
   
 
CHAPTER 2   
MALAYA: 1948-1960 
BACKGROUND 
Malaya was a British colony where for twelve years the Malayan and British forces 
successfully employed a WHAM in COIN campaign to defeat the Malayan Communist Party‟s 
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 LTC Malevich COIN brief, July 1, 2010. 
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(MCP) attempt to overthrow the government.  There are a number of factors contributing to the 
British success such as the geographical location, which gave the Malayan and British forces an 
advantage in carrying out COIN operations.  However, their successful COIN employment was 
based on those very factors.  The British and Malayan success should be judged on their ability 
to develop a successful COIN approach and not what the situation constitutes.   
The geographical location gave the Malayan and British many advantages.  According to 
the map below, Malaya is located in Southeast Asia and is separated by the South China Sea.  
The Peninsular Malaysia (East Malaya) is approximately 400 miles long and 200 miles wide.
24
  
The tropical climate fills Malaya with rain forests and jungles covering 80% of the countryside.  
Their trees exceed heights of 100 feet making aerial observation very difficult and gave an 
advantage to the MCP because its increased their ability to move freely among the local 
populace without detection.
25
  The disadvantage the Malayan and British forces had was that 
they had to increase ground forces to track suspected MCP movement.  However, the Malayan 
and British forces were still able to capitalize on the geographical location of Malaya.  The only 
land route feasible to enter into the Malaysia Peninsular (Eastern Malaya) was through a northern 
land bridge shared with Thailand.
26
  Furthermore, The Titiwangsa Mountains, about 300 miles 
long and 35 miles wide, divided Malaysia by making containment efforts more feasible.  
Additionally, the peninsular Malaysia allowed the British to gain control of its coastline making 
it difficult for external assistance to reach the MCP.            
                                                          
24
 Donald MacKay.  The Malayan Emergency 1948-60: The Domino That Stood.  London: Brassey‟s Ltd, 1997, 4. 
25
 Vernon Bartlett, Report From Malaya.   New York: Criterion Books, 1955, 30. 
26
 McKay 1997, 7. 
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http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/lgcolor/mycolor.htm 
POLITICAL SITUATION 
The Malayan Emergency took effect in June of 1948 when the British colonial forces 
declared a state of emergency in anticipation of attacks by the MCP.  As a result, the MCP 
23 
 
planned a political and guerilla offensive throughout Malaya.  The Japanese invasion of Malaya 
on December 8, 1941 provided the MCP with other opportunities to increase its networks.  
Britain and Malaya recognized that a temporary alliance of convenience with the MCP could 
benefit both sides since they shared a common enemy, the Japanese.  The alliance of 
convenience led to a MCP proposal to establish bases for attacks throughout the jungle with 
British officers overseeing guerilla training for 165 MCP members.  As a result, the Malayan 
Peoples‟ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was formed.  However, the effect of the intended 
alliance did not reach what the Malayan and British forces had hoped.  The MCP was ineffective 
in fighting the Japanese because they were passive and unwilling to make contact with the 
Japanese.
27
   
The MCP had already planned to stock up on munitions and prepared to wage an 
insurgency against the Malayan and British forces while the alliance of convenience was still in 
effect.  Contrary to what the MCP had been planning, the British and Malayan forces hoped that 
the establishment of the MPAJA would draw more Malayans seeking refuge from Japanese 
persecution into their organization.  The British and Malayan forces hoped to influence and 
indoctrinate Malayans who previously did not support communism.  However, the MPAJA and 
the MCP‟s preparations for attacks against the Japanese were withdrawn when Japan surrendered 
in August of 1945.
28
  The end of the Second World War enabled the MCP to increase its 
munitions stock pile consolidating large quantities of combat supplies left behind by the 
Japanese.  The Japanese withdrawal allowed the 10,000 strong MCP fighters to come  
out of the jungle and focus on their plans to take over the Malayan government.
29
 
INSURGENT GROUP AND GOALS 
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The ethnic Malayans were at six million people and about one-third of the country‟s 
populations were of Chinese origin.  The Chinese had been migrating from China in larger 
numbers within the previous seventy years.
30
  This number of immigrants increased as work in 
the rubber plantations and tin mines were available.
31
  Malayans preferred not to work on rubber 
plantations minimizing any tension and economic competition.  However, since the Chinese 
were considered foreigners they were forced to pay for their own schooling.  As a result, Chinese 
children were taught to be loyal to their motherland and most of their literature and teachers were 
sent from China.  The influx of the Chinese seeking work into Malaya resulted in the influx of 
Chinese communism as well.  Most of the Chinese immigrants migrated to the outskirts of where 
the general Malayan populaces were situated.  As a result the Chinese communists were able to 
connect with the native MCP who had already organized in the 1920‟s out of Singapore.
32
  The 
connection expanded the MCP numbers and increased their base of support.       
The MCP ties to the Communist states go further back.  The Soviet establishment for 
Communist expansion began in Shanghai, China and from there infiltrated into Malaya with the 
establishment of the MCP in 1929.  The ethnic Malayan populaces were resistant to the MCP, 
but it was not enough to break their increasing numbers, their influence on the labor force, and 
their political ambitions.  The Japanese attack on China in 1937 helped the MCP established 
relations with other organizations in an effort to create a unified front that brought both the 
Malayan ethnic, (those resistant to the communist ideology) and the MCP together.
33
  This was 
conveniently established for both the Malayan government and the MCP in order to deny Japan‟s 
efforts.   
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The Japanese withdrawal in Malaya allowed the MPAJA to effectively gain control of 
most of the country while establishing areas for the communist-control People‟s Committees.
34
  
This led to the MCP reorganization of its military wing to be known as the Malayan Races‟ 
Liberation Army (MRLA).
35
  The MRLA failed because the British and Malayan forces offered 
citizenship to the ethnic Chinese for their service in the war.  This dissolved the MRLA 
intentions of establishing an agenda that would argue that their purpose was for national 
liberation.  The British and Malayan authorization of citizenship also promised Malayan 
independence to ethnic Chinese, which was eventually granted in 1957.
36
  Their gains compelled 
the MCP to act in the spring of 1948 realizing that their industrial and economic subversion 
alone would not achieve their hopes of gaining power.      
The MCP initiated a plan to disrupt the Malayan government‟s declining economy by 
slashing Malayan rubber trees.  The rubber trees were a source of income for most of the 
Malayan populace.  The MCP‟s intent was to undermine the Malayan government‟s ability to 
provide economic stability and security for its people.  The map below provides a visual for tin 
and rubber locations throughout the country.  The Malayan industries were the largest producer 
of tin accounting for one-third of the world‟s tin production and 35% of the rubber.
37
  The map 
below provides the location of tin and rubber.  This suggests that the migrating Chinese would be 
located in those areas.  The MCP plan to slash the Malayan rubber trees worked in favor of the 
Malayan government because it aggravated most of the Chinese in those areas who relied on tin 
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and rubber as their main source of income.  As a result, the MCP lost a lot of support and was 
forced to change their strategy.          
 
Photo taken from E.D. Smith.  Counter-Insurgency Operations:1 Malaya and Borneo.  Page 6 
APPLYING COIN TACTICS 
 The British sought to reduce the activities of the MPAJA and MCP, who were openly 
conducting assassinations on suspected Malayans working for the Japanese.  This led the British 
27 
 
to disband the MPAJA and disregard any political requests from the MCP.  In exchange for the 
disbandment of the MPAJA, the British provided alternatives to all its members: transitional 
training for the civilian sector, a sack of rice, a job, and $350 dollars.
38
 
Malaya had been important to the British economy for a long time.  The Second World 
War nearly bankrupted the British, which made the production of tin and rubber in Malaya even 
more important to the British economy.  Rubber was one of Britain‟s main sources of income in 
1947, bringing in about $200 million dollars while an additional $180 million came from 
Britain‟s manufactured exports.
39
  However, Britain‟s profits from Malayan rubber and tin began 
to decline as MCP attacks increased.  As a result, the British Defense Coordination Committee 
Far East surveyed the progress made in Malaya and concluded that a civilian (non-military) 
position be made subordinate to the High Commissioner.  The committee also concluded that 
additional forces would not resolve the growing insurgent attacks unless a civil sector properly 
balanced their military operations.
40
 
The increase in insurgent attacks led to the appointment of a retired Lieutenant General, 
Sir Harold Rawdon Briggs.  The new position made General Briggs the new Director of 
Operations, a new post that had the authority equivalent to a Chief Secretary.  As Director of 
Operations, General Briggs had the authority to coordinate different departments involved in the 
Malayan Emergency such as the police, army, naval, and air forces.  He was an ideal candidate 
for the job.  He graduated from Sandhurst Academy, was commissioned into the Indian Army in 
1914, and served in France, Mesopotamia, and Palestine throughout the First World War.
 41
  
After the Second World War in 1946, Briggs became a general officer, finishing his appointment 
                                                          
38
 Jackson, 10. 
39
 John Newswinger.  British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland. , 41. 
40
 John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954 (Boulder: Westview 
Press Inc., 1992), 79. 
41
 Ibid., 81. 
28 
 
as Commander-in-Chief Burma Command.  His experience in Burma was one of the deciding 
factors for his appointment.  His background provided him with an understanding of Asian 
culture, which proved useful during his term in Malaya. 
 In May 1950, Briggs established the Federal Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee in 
order to address rising insurgent attacks. The committee consolidated, analyzed and redistributed 
all intelligence sources ranging from both the Malayan and British military authorities to civil, 
police, and local authorities.
42
  The operational communication among the different elements 
operating in Malaya improved and led to the development of the Federal War Council.  This 
council brought under one committee the following organizations: the chief secretary of the 
federation, the general and air officers in Malaya, commissioner of police, and the secretary of 
defense.  Similar councils were developed at the lower levels relieving most communication 
friction among the different forces operating in Malaya.  General Briggs‟s proposal proved to be 
successful as inter-operational communications throughout both military and civil forces 
operating in Malaya improved.  This led to an operational focus in which the Briggs plan was 
created and implemented.  The Briggs plan consisted of clearing Malaya from South to North, 
one section at a time by focusing on four principles: 
1.  Dominating the populated areas and building up a feeling of complete 
security in them, with the object of obtaining a steady and increasing flow of 
information from all sources. 
2. Breaking up the Min Yuen within the populated areas. 
3. Isolating the bandits from their food and information supply organization in 
the populated areas. 
4. Destroying the bandits by forcing them to attack us on our own ground.43 
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The third principle of the Briggs plan proved to be a critical element to the 
overall COIN success.  Isolating the insurgents from their base support was 
achieved through the relocation of over 500,000 locals that lasted from June of 1950 
to 1960.
44
  Majority of the relocated populace were squatters in which the insurgents 
preyed on for support.  The intent provided two purposes.  The first purpose 
allowed the denial of food, supplies and other forms of support to the insurgents.  
The second allowed the isolation of insurgents from the general populace forcing 
them out in the open and giving the British and Malayan forces better ground in 
carrying out military action.
45
  The population relocation proved to be effective, but 
it was only one part of the overall Briggs plan.  There were several other deficiencies 
the British and Malayan forces faced.      
The Briggs plan continued to focus on population support from the Malayan 
populace while creating a plan to put the British army into a role of supporting the police 
force.  This required the army and police to work cohesively.
46
  The army covered areas the 
police were not able to reach.  As a result, both the military and the police were able to establish 
headquarters in areas more prone to MCP influence in order to gain the confidence of the local 
populace.  Gaining the people‟s trust and confidence was essential to their success because they 
were the military and police‟s main source of intelligence.  General Briggs suggested that the key 
to this operation was the cooperation among the different military and civil organizations.  
General Briggs resigned due to medical issues and died in October of 1952.  In 1951, Sir Henry 
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Gurney, High Commissioner, had died in an enemy ambush.  General Sir Gerald Templer 
replaced both positions.
47
  This was an historic appointment giving dual authority to one position. 
General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed on 5 February 1952 as both the High 
Commissioner and Director of Operations.  He was an ideal candidate for the position.  Templer 
was a distinguished divisional commander appointed Director of Military Government in the 
Western Zone following the defeat of Germany.  He later became the Director of Military 
Intelligence at the War Office.
48
  Under Templer, the British WHAM COIN approach focused 
mainly on pacifying the Malayan populace through a number of approaches ranging from the 
establishment of social service projects to strengthening the Malayan police and military forces.   
The British overcame initial administrative glitches that had made daily operations 
ineffective by creating the Whitely Council.  The Whitley Council helped fix the Malayan 
administrative problems that were affecting soldier performance, such as pay, and continuity 
among experienced administrative positions.  As a result, the new changes improved the 
productivity of COIN operations while the MCP deteriorated. 
The British and Malayan forces administrative and logistical improvement led to the 
improvement of their military combat operations.  They implemented a policy in 1952 that made 
any association and support to the MCP a punishable offense.
49
  This policy was integrated in 
response to an ambush on one of British‟s premier assistant district officers, Michael Codner.  
Codner‟s loss led General Templer to arrange a meeting with about 200 village elders.  He 
imposed a 22-hour curfew and reduced the food rations.
50
  Other punishments consisted of heavy 
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fines and confinement for suspected individuals not cooperating with the British and Malayan 
officials. 
This policy was passively integrated followed by a campaign to convince the local 
populace of the usefulness of democratic principles, and that these were more beneficial than 
communist principles in terms of social, economic and political structure.  The Malayan 
government granted the populace long-term use of agricultural land and provided adequate water 
flow into those areas.
51
  The government also established a village committee to oversee the 
construction of schools, a community center, and passable roads with proper drainage systems.  
They built churches, installed proper sanitation, and formed other social projects such as boys 
and girls scout clubs.  This development became the standard for over 500 villages built by the 
end of 1951, including relocated areas.
52
  In summary, the British used rather strict policies to 
deter the Malayan populace from supporting the MCP while they integrated a WHAM approach 
to convince the local populace that their standard of living could not be matched.  
The WHAM strategy paid off.  The MCP declined, which became apparent by the 
declining number of MCP attacks on the Malayan and British government security forces.  
Between 1951 and 1953, the number of insurgency attacks decreased from 6,000 to 1,200.
53
  
Despite the drastic drop in insurgency activity, attacks remained unresolved.  The Malayan 
populace was still cautious of both the Malayan government and its security forces.  Corruption 
was widespread within the Malayan government and security forces were taking loans without 
paying them back.
54
  This was due to the low monthly checks the security forces were receiving 
forcing many government employees into debt by taking loans that were above their means.  In 
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an attempt to resolve this issue, the Malayan government paid its employees twice a month, 
helping them to better economize their salaries and refrain from borrowing.  However, these 
changes did not solve the problems completely. 
Templer decided to push for an overhaul of the Malayan police force and the newly-
created Kinta Valley Home Guard.  The home guard was a separate organization apart from the 
police force and the Malayan army.  Its purpose was to provide protection and security to areas 
where Malayans had relocated.  The declining insurgency attacks gave the Malayan government 
time to reorganize and re-train its security forces. 
 In late 1952, Operation Service was implemented; the purpose was to educate the 
Malayan police force the importance of providing protection to the people.
55
  They were 
primarily responsible for securing Malayan communities from insurgent attacks.  Under 
Operation Service, public relations were strengthened with the local populace exceeding their 
initial expectations.    
 In order to ensure effective protection the home guard was established.  As a result of 
Operation Service being a success, Templer agreed to have the home guard re-armed with better 
weapons.  This led to the establishment of the Kinta Valley Home Guard (KVHG) scheme.  
Under this scheme, the locals in the area were required to bear the costs of a home guard posted 
in their area.  Templer‟s scheme paid off.  In two years, the home guard had lost only nine 
weapons, and by 1952, their numbers had grown to over 100,000 with the capability to defend 
over 2,000 settlements.
56
  The home guard further contributed to the army and the police force 
with investigations and called in suspicious activities.  Their assistance increased the efficiency 
of the police force by providing intelligence on MCP movements.  The home guard also aided 
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the army in their operations that required movements far into the Malayan jungle.  The KVHG 
scheme was credited for having further isolated the insurgency from the local populace.  The 
home guard allowed thousands of army personnel and police officers, who were tasked to 
provide resettlement security, the chance to focus on their primary assignments. 
Moreover, the increasing efficiency of the home guard allowed the Malayan army to 
focus on offensive combat missions against the MCP insurgents. Gradually, large-scale sweeps 
were decreasing while smaller scale missions were being conducted based on police force 
intelligence.  The police force provided the army with intelligence on MCP insurgents, which 
enabled increased contact with the MCP.  The increase of MCP contact led to the increase of 
Malayan army intelligence.
57
  Furthermore, the British army provided new equipment to their 
combat operations such as the Sikorsky S55 helicopter.  The helicopter significantly improved 
the Malayan morale.
58
  It provided the Malayan army with a quicker means of travel towards its 
objective and a quicker response time for the evacuation of wounded soldiers.  The mobility and 
use of the helicopter only strengthened the Malayan army‟s sense of confidence and duty.  
 The British continued to improve in areas likely to affect their combat operations.  They 
sought to improve the Malaya Administrative Service (MAS) because it showed signs of 
inefficiency.
59
   The MAS was responsible for providing the administrative and logistical support 
of all Malayan forces involved in combating the MCP.  This included the Malayan army, the 
police force, security forces, and the home guard.  The inefficiency of the MAS was attributed to 
the poor pay and living conditions the MAS workers endured.  Key personnel left the MAS once 
they were eligible for retirement resulting in a poor retention rate.  Most replacements lacked 
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experience, which made it difficult for the Malayan government to sustain continuity with 
experienced staff.  As a result, the MAS qualifications gradually decreased.  
 Templer responded to the MAS issues by establishing a Whitely Council system. The 
Whitely Council consisted of experienced administrative personnel that helped the MAS 
establish a standard operating administrative system similar to those in the United Kingdom. The 
Whitely Council system sought recruitment from a wide range of possible candidates, not 
limiting positions to the Malayans and the British. The approach to hire non-Malayans had its 
limitations. Only a very small number of non-Malayans would qualify for the MAS. Most 
positions remained vacant. 
 Templer thought of a clever move to increase Malay‟s declining administrative services 
by recruiting administrative officers in the United Kingdom.  He targeted ethnic Chinese and 
Malayans to fill the MAS vacancies.  His idea brought not only ethnic Chinese and Malayans 
who lived in the United Kingdom to support the MAS, but it also brought important ethnic 
organizations together in support of the Malayan government.  This further increased Templer‟s 
search for qualified administrative personnel to fill the MAS vacancies.  Even though the 
colonial officer did not fully approve his proposal, he decided to follow through with his plans.  
A major search was conducted for missionaries who served in China prior to the Communist 
Party taking power.
60
  As a result, Templer recruited Dawson based on his familiarity and 
experiences of the Chinese culture.  He went on a recruiting campaign throughout the United 
Kingdom for possible applicants that could assist the MAS.  Dawson was a missionary of China; 
his experience helped him recruit ethnic Chinese and Malayans with administrative experience 
into the Whitely Council System.  Dawson‟s efforts were met with a number of applicants.  This 
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included the commitment and support of organizations, such as missionary societies and the 
China Inland Mission, all of whom were willing to expand their work into Malaya. 
 Another part of WHAM approach was the use of propaganda and psychological warfare.   
The Malayan government had used the services of any newspaper or magazine agency it had to 
publish government propaganda.  Government periodical publications numbered five million 
copies.  In addition, C.C. Too and Lam Swee, two British psychological warfare specialists, 
created their own paper called New Path News.  This paper had a monthly circulation of 
70,000.
61
  Most of these newspapers were circulated in coffee shops and other areas where 
Malayans gathered.  Community centers were built in the new villages where government 
published propaganda could be circulated.  
 In the beginning of 1955, the MCP shifted from offensive operations to a more defensive 
posture.  This development led to new social programs and agricultural land, as well as the 
establishment of new villages.  These methods proved to be a successful in severing any ties the 
MCP might have had with the Malayan local populace. 
 
OUTCOME 
The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) was a remarkable success and is widely regarded 
as the first conflict in recent history where a WHAM in COIN theory was successfully 
implemented.  Many scholars have argued over the origins and practice of the WHAM theory, 
but it was the Malayan Emergency where the approach took a pivotal role in defeating an 
insurgency. 
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The success in WHAM in COIN was due to Britain‟s flexibility to adapt and overhaul its 
administrative deficiencies due to the level of productivity it was producing.  In most areas 
where combat operations are conducted the civil-sector plays a minimal role and very little 
emphasis is placed on its ability to impact combat operations.  This case suggests that the British 
and Malaya proved in this campaign that their civil sector is just as important as the military.  
This was due to the fact that the deficiency within the civil sector involved in the Malayan 
Emergency impacted COIN operations.  The British and Malayan governments‟ decision to 
overhaul their civil-support sector proved to have a greater impact throughout COIN operations 
because the level of morale and competence reflected their relationship with the local populace.   
 However, despite the British and Malayan operational success in COIN was Galula‟s 
theory in COIN achieved?  Galula‟s theory in COIN success was achieved in this case because 
the British and the Malayan government were successful in instituting a home guard security 
force that drew from the local populace.  In most conflicts involving an insurgency, the 
insurgency group will recruit its member from the local populace.  In this case a battle between 
the insurgent group and government forces over the general populace was a success for the 
Malayans and British forces.  They succeeded in using the local populace to their advantage.  
The cooperation between the government forces and the local populace succeeded because the 
establishment of the home guard empowered the local populace to provide its own security and 
stability fulfilling Galula‟s theory in COIN success. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
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OMAN 1965-1975  
BACKGROUND 
In 1965, the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) which, after 1968 would become PFLOAG, 
began an armed revolution, which continued until 1976 against Oman‟s Sultan Said after he had 
been removed from power.  The British decided to use a WHAM approach during their 
intervention in Oman for two reasons.  The first reason was the political, social, and economic 
situation that the Omani populace endured under their ruler, Sultanate Said bin-Taymur (19XX-
XXXX).  Social services were limited, depriving the Omani populace of necessities such as 
schools, hospitals, and other forms of social and economic improvement. After Said was 
removed from power in 1970, his son, Qaboos, improved and expanded social services to the 
Omani populace with the support and advice of the British. This improvement allowed the 
British to use a WHAM approach more effectively because improving social services in Oman 
pacified the local populace.
62
  
The second reason was Britain‟s successful defeat of the Communist insurgents in 
Malaya.  The Malayan Emergency had ended successfully soon before the British intervention in 
the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman.  As a result, lessons the British had learned in the Malaya 
campaign were consolidated and re-formatted to fit an appropriate WHAM strategy in Oman. 
The timing of the event also allowed for experienced personnel who had served in the Malayan 
COIN campaign to direct and update methods for their WHAM approach in Oman.  Thus, Sultan 
Said‟s rule and his disregard for modernization helped nurture both the beginnings of an 
insurgency and his ultimate dethronement in 1970.  His unpopular policies provided the British 
with more options to use a WHAM approach with the Omani populace.  
                                                          
62
  
38 
 
There are no set conditions for countering an insurgency, but WHAM in 
counterinsurgency is based on winning the support of the local populace. Because of Said‟s 
failure to provide social welfare to his people, the British were able to win the support of the 
local population, making WHAM in COIN much more effective.  For this reason, it is important 
to explore Said‟s form of governance.  It contributed to the root causes of Oman‟s insurgency 
and, ironically, helped set the conditions for WHAM in COIN to take full effect. 
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POLITICAL SITUATION  
Said and the British (1932-1970) 
 The Anglo-Omani relations date as far back as the early 17th century, with British 
economic interests conducted through the East India Company.  It was not until Napoleon‟s 
campaign in Egypt in 1798 that the British and the Imam of Masqat finalized a treaty.
63
 
Protecting British interests in the region, the treaty prohibited any and all French authorities from 
establishing and conducting business of any nature throughout Masqat, the capital of the 
Sultanate of Oman.  The British served as a protectorate to the Omani state in 1798 under the 
Anglo-Omani treaty.  The British considered Oman one of its informal territories.  Anglo-Omani 
relations strengthened over time, especially when oil was discovered and produced throughout 
the Arabian Peninsula in the 1900s. 
One reason for Oman‟s instability at that time was the structural location of its cities.  An 
estimated 1,000-kilometer spread of desert plains separates the governing capital in Muscat, 
located in Northern Oman, from the Dhofar province in the area of Salalah in the South of 
Oman.
64
  The divided locations helped provide division among the government and its people 
and enabled an insurgency more room to expand without government interference, but the 
discovery of oil in Oman in the 1960s made a rebellion more favorable to pursue.
65
  Oil meant 
that there was going to be large revenues of income coming into the country.  This further 
increased the insurgent groups‟ motivation for seeking power.  The geographical location was 
only one of the reason for a rebellious effort against Said. 
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 Another reason for Oman‟s instability was Said‟s style of government.  Said‟s dominance 
can be described as cruel by present-day Western standards, but it was known to be a normal 
practice in the Omani culture.  Amputating the hands of thieves and stoning adulterers only 
meant that stealing and adulterous acts would certainly result in physical punishment.  The use of 
alcohol was punishable by a few days in prison and confinement to leg chains, which nearly 
eliminated use of alcohol in Oman.  These harsh forms of punishment demonstrate how much 
control Said had in Oman.  Said also built a cordon around his city, closing main entrances three 
hours after sunset.  This increased the tensions the Omani populace had with its government and 
increased support for a rebellion.  
The British needed support when Oman faced a Saudi-sponsored internal tribal rebellion 
in 1958.
66
  A small task force sent by the British defeated this revolt.  Following the rebellion in 
1958, a treaty was signed, allowing the British access to airbases in Salalah and Masirah Island.  
The treaty gave Said some form of security against potential rebellions, but it was not enough to 
ensure stability throughout the country.  
Following the 1958 treaty that allowed the British access to Omani airbases in Salalah 
and Masirah Island, the British sent loan service personnel (LSP) to train the Sultan‟s Armed 
Forces (SAF).  Despite the need to expand and give authority to his own military, Said did the 
exact opposite.  He feared that the commissioning of Omani soldiers to the officer ranks might 
result in a coup against him.
67
  His suspicion of a coup together with his unwillingness to give 
authority to his soldiers further added to Said‟s isolation and gave more reason for a rebellion to 
take place. 
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 Oman‟s insurgency stemmed mainly from Said‟s leadership style and belief that the 
prevention of modernization was good for Oman.  Said purposely neglected his country from 
development despite having the income generated from oil.  Neighboring states that generated 
income from oil used those funds to help build and increase their own infrastructure increasing 
the employment rate as well as more access to schools and medical services.  Said viewed this as 
a potential for his country to fall in debt while millions of dollars generated from Omani oil were 
deposited into his personal accounts overseas.  He also perceived development as a means that 
would erode and weaken their cultural and religious practices.  Said believed that Oman would 
follow in the same path as its neighboring states if it were to share in its oil riches.  More money 
in the hands of Omanis meant corruption and greed and that it would interfere with the societal 
cultural traditions.  He believed money would increase Oman‟s problems because it would have 
the potential to be the focus of a tribal society.  In an attempt to keep Oman pure and his rule 
intact, Said prevented any modernizing influences from entering Oman.
68
  Said prohibited 
anything that was Western.  This ranged from vehicles and bicycles to dancing, music, and 
cameras.
69
  His reign left the people of Oman living in primitive conditions even though revenue 
was being generated from oil.  Said kept all income generated from oil to himself, believing that 
disbursing those funds back to the local populace of Oman would either ruin the country or 
slowly diminish Oman‟s cultural and religious practices.  In contrast to Said‟s belief, the 
majority of the Omani populace wanted to modernize and reap the rewards of being an oil state 
and Omanis insurgencies were more than willing to provide that. 
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It is important to note that despite Said‟s feudal rule he was educated at Mayo College in 
Britain.
70
  Since the start of his rule in 1932 at the age of 21 he is credited for having bringing 
Oman out of debt.
71
  As a result, Said was determined to keep his country free from debt.  He 
believed that a country in debt only meant that its authority and power would decrease.  It also 
meant that being in debt to another country opened the possibility for that country to interfere in 
ones affairs.  Increasing the development of Oman‟s‟ economic policy meant that more Omanis 
would be prone to take out loans.  Either way, Said interpreted a leap towards modernization as a 
leap towards debt.
72
  He claimed that the practice of borrowing money among the local populace 
for investments in modernization would lead to debt, and that debt was a practice that conflicted 
with the Islamic belief.  Indeed, Said‟s success in bringing his country out of debt was a big 
accomplishment; he was determined to keep it that way even if it meant the prevention of 
modernization in Oman. 
Despite Said‟s reasoning, the British were displeased with Said‟s decision to ignore 
internal development.  In 1967 when Oman was generating oil, Said spent close to nothing on the 
Omani infrastructure.  He ignored British requests for a developmental program despite a 1958 
treaty he had signed promising to develop Oman with oil revenues.
73
  The British continued their 
pressure on Said to provide Oman‟s local populace with the needed care of hospitals, schools, 
and roads, but they were ignored.  By 1970, when Said was overthrown, Oman had only few 
roads, one hospital, and three primary schools for a population of about one million.
74
   Oman‟s 
literacy rate was 5% while the infant mortality rate was 75%.
75
  Despite the low literacy rate and 
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high infant mortality rate, Said had responded to British criticism indicating that the country 
could only support a small population and if more hospitals were built then there would be more 
people dying of starvation.
76
  In an attempt to support his position, Said reasoned that the British 
lost India because they had constructed schools.  Said was stern on enforcing his restrictive 
policies because he believed that it was in the best interest of his country. 
INSURGENT GROUPS AND GOALS 
Said‟s attempt to keep Oman isolated from the influences of modernization and the 
outside world had devastating consequences.  His decisions increased tensions with the British. 
A rebellion against Said‟s rule took place in 1962 by some Dhofaris led by Musallim bin Nufl 
who attacked an oil exploration group resulting in the destruction of one oil exploration 
vehicle.
77
  On 9 June 1965, this group reorganized as the DLF. 
The DLF began to expand its networks associating itself with the People‟s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY).  As a result, the DLF received powerful backing from the Soviets 
and Chinese who understood the strategic importance of Oman.  The DLF also received support 
from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.  They provided them with a headquarters base just outside 
the Omani border in Hauf and Al Ghayda, Yemen.  In Al Ghayda, the DLF consolidated 
assistance consisting of weapons, food, medical supplies and training. They also used Hauf as a 
center for re-educating Dhofari children.
78
  They recruited and kidnapped elder males of military 
age in Dhofari and sent them to Russia and China for training in Marxist-Leninist ideology and 
guerilla warfare.  Through this support and training, the DLF became better equipped and, in fact, 
paralleled the standard framework of a communist insurgency group.  The new changes and 
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added training to the DLF led to a name change.  The DLF became The People’s Front for the 
Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) in August of 1968.
79
  
The British Omani relations soured under the rule of Said because of his refusal to 
undergo any form of development in Oman.  The British disapproved Said‟s use of oil revenues, 
mainly because he had established foreign private accounts for oil revenues that he used towards 
his personal ventures.  Oman also became a significant concern for the British because of the 
establishment of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG).  The 
PFLOAG conducted a number of violent retaliatory acts against Said‟s forces with the aid of the 
Communist states Russia and China and their Middle Eastern associates.  This concerned the 
British because Oman was strategically situated overseeing a key oil route, the Strait of Hormuz. 
The majority of the oil to the British and their allies passed through the Strait of Hormuz.  The 
United Arab Emirates controlled a forty-meter spread overlooking the Strait of Hormuz, but 
Oman owned the tip, the Musandam Peninsula to be specific. The Musandam Peninsula 
belonged to Oman despite the UAE (United Arab Emirates. territories that separated the 
Musandam Peninsula from the rest of Oman.
80
  As a result, whoever controlled Oman controlled 
the Musandam Peninsula. 
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The British were additionally interested in Oman because of the Cold War. The two 
superpowers fought throughout the Middle East indirectly.  If PFLOAG were to succeed in 
Oman, its communist sponsors would be in a position to disrupt the flow of oil channeling 
through the Strait of Hormuz.  Oman became strategically too important for the British to ignore. 
The traffic through the Strait of Hormuz consisted of large oil tankers passing through every 10 
minutes.
81
  Thirty percent of the oil consumed in the United States passed through the Strait of 
Hormuz while 70% of oil consumed by Western Europe and 90% of oil consumed by Japan 
                                                          
81
 Ibid, 3. 
46 
 
passed through the Strait of Hormuz.
82
  By the 1970s, about 80% of oil going to Western Europe 
passed through the Strait of Hormuz.  If the PFLOAG succeeded in Oman, it would provide its 
sponsors, the Soviet Union, an opportunity to disrupt oil going to Western Europe, which meant 
the disruption of Western Europe‟s economic and defense posture.  The loss of Oman to a 
communist regime would have had devastating effects on the western European economy in 
general, and on British interests in the Middle East specifically. The rebellion, therefore, made 
British intervention inevitable.  
As stated above, the PFLOAG‟s popularity grew because of Said‟s denial of 
modernization.  This presented obstacles for the British who were looking to win the support of 
the Omani populace in their attempt to wage an effective WHM campaign in counterinsurgency.  
Despite Said‟s unwillingness to provide internal development with its oil revenues, the British 
were confident that if given the opportunity, Said‟s son, Qaboos, would be a more cooperative 
leader of Oman.  He would move Oman towards modernization and win more local support. 
Therefore, it was rumored that the British planned a coup against Said and to replace him with 
his son, Qaboos.  They carried it out while most of Said‟s loyal supporters spent their leave 
abroad.
83
  The transition went unimpeded, and by the time the Omani populace discovered the 
coup in July of 1970, Said was on his way to London where he spent the rest of his days in exile. 
The Omani populace favored modernization, which made the transition of power from Said to 
Qaboos less complicated. 
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Qaboos and the British (1970-PRESENT) 
Modernization of Oman was finally made possible when on July of 1970 the Sultan Said 
was overthrown by the Omani army and replaced by his son Qaboos.
84
 Qaboos was granted the 
title of Sultanate of Oman.  He pushed towards modernization and eased the British efforts 
towards their WHAM campaign at the height of Oman‟s insurgencies.  Qaboos had an 
educational and military background that influenced his modernization of Oman.  He was 
privately educated at Britain‟s‟ Sandhurst Military Academy and commissioned into the Scottish 
infantry following graduation.
85
  Said held Qaboos captive after he returned from his studies at 
Britain‟s Sandhurst Military Academy.  Prior to the coup that ended Sultan Said‟s reign, Said 
had accused his son of favoring modernization and put him under house arrest for six years.  The 
change in Omani leadership from Said to his son Qaboos was vital for Britain‟s COIN operations.  
Qaboos made some drastic changes in spending that were vital for Britain‟s economic 
interests in Oman.  He used oil revenues to establish social services, building schools, clinics, 
and other social necessities that the Omani populace urgently needed.  Qaboos reconsolidated oil 
revenues to re-equip and rearm his military.  The graph below shows how much money Qaboos 
spent on defense alone.  Money spent during his first year as Sultan consisted of 15.2% of 
Oman‟s Gross National Product (GNP).  The percentage of Oman‟s GNP reached 40.9% by 
1975.
86
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As the new Sultan of Oman, Qaboos faced minimal friction within his administration 
during his initial appointment on July of 1970.  He confronted internal opposition but not at a 
level that presented potential insecurities to Oman‟s stability.  During Qaboos initial reign as 
Oman‟s Sultan, he held the ministry position of the interior, foreign affairs, and finance.
87
  His 
advisors immediately established an interim council to prevent a power vacuum from occurring.   
As a result, the council was chosen without the knowledge or authorization of Qaboos.  One 
appointment that caused minimal opposition within the Qaboos administration was the 
appointment of Sayyid Tariq as prime minister.  Tariq had been exiled in Germany and was 
brought back when he became prime minister.  Qaboos and Tariq‟s working relations were not 
well coordinated despite Tariq‟s establishment of the different ministries within government.
88
  
Their working relationship took different directions as neither bothered to inform the other of 
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their progress.   Both Qaboos and Tariq had differing views on the future of Oman, which 
showed in their selection of key personnel in their departments.  Qaboos‟s neglect to inform 
Tariq of financial and defense matters led to Tariq‟s resignation on December of 1971. This was 
the end of Qaboos‟ opposition.  
 In January of 1972, Qaboos formed a new government making himself the prime minister 
as well as the minister of defense, minister of finance, and minister of foreign affairs.
89
  This was 
complimentary to Oman‟s counterinsurgency campaign because it allowed Qaboos free reign to 
focus his efforts on the much-needed improvement of his military without internal opposition.  
A few important individuals formed the foundation and experience from which a COIN 
approach in Oman was drawn: two of whom are Julian Paget, and Frank Kitson.  They provided 
the theoretical basis for an approach to a counterinsurgency campaign in Oman.
90
  Their different 
approaches were broad but necessary in creating a plan to best fit a certain insurgency scenario.     
Most insurgents are motivated by different reasons, and producing a COIN approach depended 
on a state‟s economic, cultural, and political standing.  Paget and Kitson provided that basis for 
developing a COIN plan in Oman ,which British officers serving there used as a guideline for 
constructing a modified plan to combat Oman‟s insurgencies.  It is important to take note of their 
theories because they show how British COIN evolved and modified over the course of their 
campaign in Oman.  Having a flexible COIN approach is necessary because of the changing 
tactics used by the insurgents.  
Paget‟s theory in COIN contributed to the founding principles for a COIN approach in 
Oman.  He was a British officer who had served in Palestine from 1945 to 1948 and, in the late 
1960s, was tasked to developed approaches to countering anti-British sentiment in Aden, 
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Yemen.
91
  In his book Counter-insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerilla Warfare, Paget 
developed approaches based on his experiences.  He identified five elements that he believed 
these approaches were absolutely necessary in a COIN campaign: 
1.  Civil-military understanding. 
2. Joint command and control structure. 
3. Good intelligence. 
4. Mobility. 
5. Training.  
Frank Kitson‟s COIN theory and work is not limited to the British approach in Oman.  Kitson 
was a decorated veteran who had fought in Kenya and Malaya prior to his appointment to the 
British War Office, and rose to the rank of general in the early 1980s.  At the War office, Kitson 
contributed to the planning phase for operations in Oman.
92
   His book, Low Intensity Operations, 
caused a lot of controversy because of his criticism of the British army for training strictly on 
conventional warfare.  He argued that most of British conflicts involved conventional warfare 
and that there needed to be more training emphasis on COIN operations.  Unlike Paget‟s five 
elements of COIN, Kitson categorized his approach based on two areas.  The first was defensive 
operations, which should include operations preventing the insurgency from disrupting any 
activities, for instance, civil operations such as development and other forms of programs geared 
towards WHAM of a targeted local populace.
93
  Kitson‟s second area of focus was offensive 
operations, which aimed at rooting out an insurgency.  This required a military emphasis in the 
destruction of insurgent forces.  He emphasized the importance of keeping an equal balance of 
both defensive and offensive operations.  More focus on defensive than on offensive operations 
would give free reign for an insurgency to expand its recruitment and ideology.  The same 
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applies in reverse where more focus on offensive than defensive operations might give 
insurgents the ability to exploit certain areas and use them as a way to undermine the current 
government.
94
   
What makes British COIN approaches distinguishable from other employing power of 
COIN is its flexibility to adjust and adopt new methods as the insurgency evolves.  Both military 
and civil authorities understood that an insurgency could not be fought based on a single doctrine 
but methods would have to change in accordance with a constantly changing combat 
environment.  General John Akehurst proved this very point when as he was assigned to the 
British efforts in Oman.  His appointment led to the expansion and oversight of the COIN 
campaign in Oman.
95
  
The British proposal to COIN in Oman began with a military approach that was 
necessary prior to implementing a WHAM approach.  Colonel John Watts, top commander for 
the SAS in Oman, proposed a WHAM approach to COIN involving five fronts.  This approach 
originated from Thompson‟s theory on COIN (discussed in chapter one) as well as Paget and 
Kitson‟s theory and was structured to fit Oman‟s insurgency activities at the time.
96
  Watt‟s 
proposal therefore reflected the situation the British were facing in Oman.  His proposal was 
made during Said‟s reign but was not approved and fully implemented until Qaboos took over as 
the Sultan of Oman in 1970.    
Watt‟s (theory discussed in chapter one) approach began to take its initial form, but 
unfortunately, the PFLOAG had already made significant gains with the local populace.  By 
1970, the PFLOAG were better equipped than Oman‟s government forces.  They found safe 
havens in Yemen and through their networks received supplies consisting of Kalashnikov rifles, 
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heavy machine guns, 82mm mortar rounds, rocket propelled grenades (RPG‟s), and Katyusha 
rockets.  They were situated in the mountains of Jebel Akhdar, a critical area for British 
pacification.  The British-led COIN managed to establish a foothold in the Jebel Akhdar area. 
This allowed for follow-on groups such as the civil action teams to move in and conduct a 
WHAM approach.
97
  
 Qaboos assisted the civil action teams by integrating a policy that allowed monetary 
rewards for the surrender of individuals involved with PFLOAG.  Monetary rewards were to be 
paid to the surrendered individuals without punishment for their previous insurgent activities.   
This policy was very favorable for individuals who wanted to reintegrate into the Omani 
populace after observing better living conditions.  The level of surrendered PFLOAG was higher 
than expected, making Qaboos‟s policy of monetary incentive a success. 
 The British capitalized on the increasing numbers of surrendering PFLOAG members by 
establishing a group specifically designed to collect intelligence from individuals who defected.
98
   
The British obtained effective intelligence because the defectors were well aware of key terrain 
and tactics the PFLOAG were using.  Intelligence provided information on PFLOAG 
strongholds and their usual standard operating procedures.  This fulfilled Watt‟s first front of 
COIN, which was the collection of effective intelligence.  
 Operation Jaguar facilitated the initial foothold into Jebel.  The battle lasted a total of 5 
hours and resulted in PFLOAG‟s loss of about 80 soldiers while 12 were captured.  Some of the 
dead were transported to Salalah and put on display to show the populace that the government 
was enforcing its laws and that it sucessfully defeated the PFLOAG insurgents.
99
  The British 
and the Omani governments needed reinforcements to continue further into enemy territory.  In 
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1973, the Sultan Qaboos received a reinforcement of 1,500 soldiers from Iran who were 
equipped and trained by the U.S. The Iranian reinforcement was used to keep a route open that 
connected Salalah to Jebel and on to Thumrait heading north.  The PFLOAG began to attack the 
Iranian reinforcements but were not able to achieve their objective.  The route continued to stay 
open allowing undisrupted movement of British and Omani forces.   
      
       Photo taken from Donald Hawley page 243. 
In conjunction with route security a 35 mile defensive barrier was constructed to prevent 
reinforcement of the PFLOAG.  The higher ground along the barrier was used as a security post 
overlooking areas occupied by Omani forces.  The barrier made drastic gains in cutting off 
resupply to the PFLOAG.  PFLOAG supporters were no longer able to bring large amounts of 
resupply by camel.  Supplies would have to be carried through the established barrier, and the 
carriers would risk being detected by ground sensors or being blown up by the mines. The new 
barrier significantly minimized the supply of ammunition, weapons, food or any other equipment 
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that the PFLOAG were receiving.  As a result, the shortage of supplies PFLOAG were receiving 
limited their capabilities.  The British and Omanis reinforced the initial barrier calling it the 
Hammer Line.  The addition allowed the British and Omani forces to focus more effectively on 
pacification without worrying as much about PFLOAG disturbances.  
 
Photo taken from Geraint Hughes page 286. 
 
OUTCOME 
One of the principal factors in the success of the British employment of COIN in Oman 
was focusing on obtaining reliable intelligence.  The method in obtaining key intelligence 
throughout the Oman campaign is related to a WHAM in COIN because it was able to create a 
force called Firqat that consisted of former PFLOAG members.  Persuasion was the method used 
55 
 
to obtain members for the Firqat.  The British and Oman were able to provide PFLOAG 
members an alternative that in return would require their allegiance.  This was achieved through 
monetary and vocational training incentives.  The incentives as well as the Omani development 
programs won not only the local populace but a fraction of the PFLOAG organization.   
Galula‟s theory in COIN success was achieved in Oman because its campaign succeeded 
in WHAM of the local populace and members from the PFLOAG organization.  A contributing 
factor that allowed for the Omani populace to sustain its own security and stability was the 
creation of the Firqat force.  In comparison to the Malayan Emergency where the home guard 
was recruited out of the populace, the Firqat force was recruited out of the PFLOAG 
organization which made intelligence on the enemy situation more accurate and effective.  As 
the Firqat force increased, the PFLOAG declined.  This eventually led to the isolation of 
PFLOAG forces from the local populations.   
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPARISON 
 Despite the review of one governing power and their employment of WHAM in COIN, 
the results used for comparison will lie in the differences of approach used in two different 
cultures.  It is too easy to say that the British successfully employed a WHAM strategy in COIN 
in both Malaya and Oman without taking into consideration the differences in approach that was 
applied in two different countries both politically, culturally and geographically. 
POLITICAL SITUATION 
The political setting is very important in the employment of COIN because it provides the 
conditions for an employing power to produce an effective COIN strategy.  What makes the 
British approach distinct from that of other employing powers of COIN in a political setting was 
that it had two successive COIN victories based in two different settings.  In Malaya, prior to the 
disruptions of insurgency forces the British had already occupied Malaya.  As a result of their 
occupation, the local populace had built up a tolerance level to their exposure of British forces. 
This provides better conditions in employing a WHAM in COIN strategy.  However, the political 
setting was different for both Malaya and Oman.  The British had already established a presence 
in Malaya and had already been monitoring the progress and intentions of the MCP.  This was 
evident when the British in anticipation of MCP attacks declared a state of emergency.  In 
contrast to the British in Oman, British forces were asked to assist in neutralizing the Omani 
insurgency.  
In Oman, the British made several attempts to establish a policy that would appease the 
local population in order to minimize hostility towards their government as well as MCP 
propaganda.  They realized that under Sultan Said, conducting a COIN operation would be 
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difficult to carry out because of their differences with Sultan Said in generating a favorable 
policy for the local populaces.  As a result, the British helped orchestrate a coup against Sultan 
Said and had him replaced with his son Sultan Qaboos who had been confined within his own 
home.  The British were well aware of Sultan Qaboos eagerness in modernizing Oman making 
the employment of COIN practices much easier to apply.  As a result, Sultan Qaboos helped the 
British facilitate a successful COIN operation.  
COMPARISON TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR (GWOT)  
There are numerous comparisons to be made in comparing the political situations 
in Oman and Malaya to the GWOT.  In contrast to the political situations confronted by 
the British, the GWOT is currently an ongoing military campaign led by the U.S. with 
support from the United Kingdom, National Atlantic Treaty Organization‟s (NATO) and 
other non-NATO countries.  The campaign began in 2001 in response to the September 
11 attacks on the World Trade Center.  Former U.S. President George W. Bush used the 
phrase GWOT to describe the global, political, and ideological struggle against terrorist 
organizations and states that support or sponsor terrorism goals.  While the insurgencies 
in Malaya and Oman were primarily domestic, the U.S. and their allies were confronted 
with a global insurgency.  The U.S. led forces on the GWOT fought insurgent 
organizations out of Afghanistan and Iraq and were faced with alleged safe havens out in 
Pakistan supporting the insurgency. 
     What makes the political situation for the U.S. much more complicated in 
contrast to what the British faced is that global terrorism suggests that there are other 
states involved that either discreetly supports the insurgent group or neglect to intervene 
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on suspected insurgent activities being carried out within their own borders.  The GWOT 
also puts the U.S. on a global scale because the U.S. needs the support of its allies to help 
sustain their current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Historically counterinsurgency 
is a long drawn out process with very little success which would require the U.S. to 
sustain its relations abroad in good standing and convince them that defeating global 
insurgency is in everyone‟s interest.   
 The British in Malaya and Oman demonstrated how the political setting can affect the 
employment of WHAM in COIN.  Despite the differences regarding the political setting the 
British experienced in both Malaya and Oman their ability to produce a successful working 
relationship with its clients in terms of productively employing COIN strategies.  This was 
evident because of the previous working relationship the British had with the Malayan 
government and their ability to establish support of COIN strategies with the government of 
Oman through Sultan Qaboos.   Both case studies suggest that the effectiveness of COIN 
employment begins with an employing powers relationship with their clients on how they can 
produce a unified COIN plan. 
  What is suggested based on these two case studies is that an employing power of COIN 
will always need the support of their client in order to effectively function and implement COIN 
principles.  The conditions and difficulty in achieving a unified partnership are based on the 
previous relationship it had with its client prior to being confronted with an insurgency.  Because 
the political situations are always different between two states there is not a single approach that 
meets the criteria for the entire GWOT (Global War on Terror).    
APPLYING COIN TACTICS 
COMPARE STRATEGIES TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR. 
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A key factor in achieving COIN success was the protection of the local populaces from 
insurgent activities.  Because the employment of COIN operations is a long, drawn out process 
insurgencies have a tendency to extort and coerce the local populaces for money and support in 
order to sustain their operations.  These exchanges sometimes involve the use of brute force 
among the local populace in conjunction with the disruption tactics it conducts against its 
government.  What is important to understand between an employing power of COIN and the 
approaches insurgent organizations use is that what works for the insurgent organizations may 
not necessarily mean it would work for an employing power of COIN.  The brute force an 
insurgency uses to spread their ideology might not be too receptive by the local populace when a 
foreign power employs those methods because they can easily be perceived as a foreign power 
oppressing the local populaces making an insurgent goals look more attractive.    
 What these two case studies suggest is that the security of the local populace was needed 
in order for other methods of COIN to work such as civil development and effective governance.  
The British employed two different approaches in Malaya and Oman to achieve security.  The 
British in Malaya relocated about 600,000 Malayans to controlled areas in order to effectively 
protect the local populace.  This was a successful effort however, the British did not use this 
approach in Oman because it would have had a reverse effect due to the cultural differences and 
livelihood Oman and Malaya had.   
 The British success in population relocation in Malaya worked because a majority of the 
local populace relied on agriculture to sustain their standard of living.  What the British did in 
conjunction with relocating hundreds of thousands of Malayans was to offer everyone alternate 
agricultural land use.  Not only did the British succeed in providing the local populace alternate 
means of sustainability but it helped the local populace rely more on their government.  Another 
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breakthrough the British achieved after the establishment of concentrated areas was the 
establishment of the home guard.  This improved security conditions among the Malayan 
populace because the home guard was made up of people from the concentrated areas.  The 
British gains in security continued to improve because the Malayan populace within the 
concentrated areas was responsible for financing the home guard.  Rather than complain about 
new tax policies to fund the Home Guard the Malayan populace felt like they were a part of the 
overall effort.  This was evident when the home guard started to provide better intelligence to the 
Malayan police on insurgent activity.       
  In contrast to the British approach in Malaya, the British approach in Oman did not 
involve mass relocation of the local populace.  The geographical difference altered the outcome 
of a COIN approach.  The Malayan populace relied on agriculture because they lived in a climate 
that supported it therefore, the relocation of thousands of Malayans who relied on agriculture 
were able to sustain their means of economic gain.  In contrast, the Omani environment is almost  
total opposite from Malaya.  Oman is more desert like and relocating thousands of Omanis 
would have interfered with their ability to herd livestock to areas where grass and water is 
available.   
 In contrast to the British and Malayan forces offering its populaces alternate farming 
grounds, the Omani government increased its civil development and social welfare programs.  
This was in conjunction with the creation and use of the Firqat force.  The British and Omani 
governments offered incentives to the PFLOAG insurgents ranging from a lump sum of money 
to vocational rehabilitation and opportunity for employment under the Firqat force.  This 
enhanced Britain‟s and Oman‟s military operations because it minimized the expansion of the 
PFLOAG and undermined their efforts.   
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The British strategies in Malaya and Oman demonstrate that the employment of COIN 
approaches cannot be used a specific model because every COIN scenario is different.  This is a 
result of the different conditions an operational environment contains.  To effectively employ 
COIN strategies the political, economic, and diplomatic relationship between two states dictates 
an effective COIN approach. 
A super power‟s use of COIN cannot justify the approaches for other super powers to 
employ the same methods.  Just because the British succeeded in Malaya and Oman using certain 
COIN approaches does not mean that those methods will work elsewhere.  The two case studies 
show how thinking outside of the norm and the use of innovative ideas is almost a requirement in 
order to achieve COIN success.  This can be a very difficult process if most employing powers of 
COIN rely heavily on their military for COIN results.  Because of the cultural differences, there 
are no specific approaches that would meet the criteria for all of the GWOT.  However, there are 
COIN principles that can be used by other employing powers of COIN.  The two case studies 
show the importance of securing the local populace.  So in order to achieve COIN success the 
security of the local populace is vital for further COIN approaches to take place.  The measures 
taken by an employing power of COIN to achieve security and success throughout the 
employment of a COIN campaign will depend on their ability to understand and integrate the 
cultural, economic, and diplomatic aspects of COIN employment.  
 
CONCLUSION 
A. FURTHER STUDIES ON WHAM  
What the Malayan and Oman case studies suggest is that without the support of the local  
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 populace COIN efforts will not be a success.  Without the support of the population the 
possibility for targeted areas to isolate the insurgents among them becomes very minimal.  
Therefore in order to explore the possibilities of what Galula argues to be COIN success WHAM 
must be integrated into a COIN plan.  And even if WHAM is achieved there are no guarantees 
that Galula‟s theory of success will endure.  The question is not whether COIN is the preferred 
method in combating an insurgency but how to achieve and sustain the support of a targeted 
populace during and after COIN operations.  Because WHAM is essential in achieving COIN 
success there are previous cases that can provide a model in specifically achieving a WHAM 
approach.  Greg Mortenson,  a humanitarian working in Pakistan is a prime example.       
B. BUILDING SCHOOLS TO COMBAT TERRORISM 
The Central Asia Institute, led by Greg Mortenson, believes that education can go a long 
way in combating terrorism.   
Mortenson‟s schools have educated poor villagers in Pakistan and thereby provided 
opportunities to areas most vulnerable to Taliban recruitment.  Some of those who are enrolled in 
Mortenson‟s schools later became assets within their community, bolstering education and 
increasing the productivity of its medical clinics.  According to Mortenson, two former Taliban 
members became teachers at one of his schools for girls.
100
  Another success story includes a 
young woman named Aziza.  She lived along the Afghan border in a very conservative rural 
society.  Despite the opposition that she received from her peers while attending school, she 
became the first person in her village to graduate from high school.  Aziza currently serves as the 
only maternal health care worker in her region.  Despite having no clinics, medicine, or even 
medical supplies, Aziza provided medical services ranging from immunizations to maternal 
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deliveries.  Prior to occupying her post in 2000, the female infancy death rate ranged from 5 to 
25. Since Aziza began her work, the female infancy death rate now stands at zero.
101
 
Greg Mortenson clearly champions the idea of WHAM. What makes him successful in 
his work is that he is operating out of the goodness of his heart. He is dedicated in his efforts. In 
a counterinsurgency campaign, these characteristic are needed to win the local population over.    
People can distinguish sincerity from arrogance.  Loyal networks are built up over time, which 
can be very time-consuming but very resourceful in the end.  Mortenson‟s journey of building 
schools has allowed him to discover new methods making an impact on society on a larger scale: 
through expanding and focusing his efforts on educating and providing schools for girls.  
 Mortenson believes that educating a generation of girls in Pakistan is important, and from a 
counterinsurgency point of view, that it would be ideal in attacking terrorism at its roots.  In an 
Afghani and Pakistani culture, a mother plays an important role in the family.  Before a son 
decides to leave the family and pursue a future career, he must receive the blessing of his mother.   
According to Mortenson, educated mothers are more likely to disapprove any involvement their 
sons may have with religious extremist organizations such as the Taliban.  In Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, it is a shameful act for a son to disobey his family‟s wishes, so in most cases, the 
sons stay loyal to their families and, as a result, the pool for Taliban recruitment becomes 
smaller.
102
  Building schools can thus have a long-lasting effect not only in terms of minimizing 
insurgency recruitment but also on terms of building relationships.  As Mortenson notes, “One 
reason that I think we've been effective over there in forging relationships and getting things 
done at least half of it is our intuitive sense, or „When your heart speaks, take good notes.‟ So 
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what's just as important as the summit is the climb; not the product, but the process. It's about the 
relationships.”
103
  
 
 http://politicspeaksvalleys.files.wordpress.com/2009/03/mortenson-at-work.jpg 
Mortenson and the Central Asia Institute have built over 70 schools in Pakistan, in areas 
that are very hostile and more prone to terrorist recruitment.  He states that “Schools are a much 
more effect bang for the buck than missiles or chasing some Taliban around the country.”
104
   
The U.S. spends at least $500,000 per tomahawk missile dropped into Afghanistan.
105
  That is 
equivalent to the construction of over 20 schools built by aide groups within that region, which 
in the end could be much more effective in counterinsurgency.  Lieutenant Colonel Christopher 
Kolenda, who served in Afghanistan‟s front lines, agrees, “I am convinced that the long-term 
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solution to terrorism in general, and Afghanistan specifically, is education. The conflict here will 
not be won with bombs but with books.”
106
 
 In fact, the Taliban has acknowledged that education is a threat to its organization.  It has 
included educational facilities on its roster of targets, which also includes government buildings, 
police stations, and social areas.  It has banned girls from attending school.  In 2007, the Taliban 
had destroyed 162 schools for girls and 88 schools for boys. In other regions of Afghanistan, its 
government security forces had prevented about 10,000 students from attending school because 
it needed to secure about 40 schools to provide sufficient security against the Taliban.  The 
Taliban has enforced strict regulations on the local populace, forcing women to wear veils and 
the men to wear traditional clothing and grow beards.  They have threatened death to anyone 
who violated their demands and even made an example of a schoolteacher who refused to follow 
Taliban rules.  To prove their point, the Taliban killed the teacher and hung his body on an 
electricity pole.
107   
This study is open to further research because COIN is a very complex and time 
consuming process.  Achieving a WHAM approach in COIN can mean different things 
depending on the geographical location, the current political atmosphere, the economic policies 
of a targeted area, culture and even religion.  These factors contribute to the development of a 
WHAM in COIN strategy and therefore each case where a governing power applies COIN 
principles its results will vary 
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ACRONYMS 
COIN – Counterinsurgency 
CT – Counterterrorism  
DLF – Dhofar Liberation Front 
LSP – Loan Service Personnel 
FM – Field Manuel 
GWOT – Global War on Terror 
KVHG – Kinta Valley Home Guard  
MAS – Malayan Administrative Service  
MCP – Malayan Communist Party 
MPAJA – Malayan Peoples‟ Anti-Japanese Army 
MRLA – Malayan Races‟ Liberation Army 
PFLOAG – Popular Front for the Liberation of Occupied Arabian Gulf  
PDRY – Peoples‟ Democratic Republic of Yemen  
UAE – United Arab Emirates 
WHAM – Winning the Hearts and Minds 
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